Collateral, liquidity and debt sustainability by Niemann, S & Pichler, P
ISSN 1755-5361 
  
      
        
 
 Discussion Paper Series 
 
    
   
    
 
Collateral, liquidity and debt sustainability 
 
Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler 
 
 
Note : The Discussion Papers in this series are prepared by members of the Department of 
Economics, University of Essex, for private circulation to interested readers. They often 
represent preliminary reports on work in progress and should therefore be neither quoted nor 
referred to in published work without the written consent of the author. 
                                 University of Essex 
 
 
 
       Department of Economics 
 
 
 
No. 730 August 2013 
Collateral, liquidity and debt sustainability∗
Stefan Niemann† Paul Pichler‡
August 6, 2013
Abstract
We study the sustainability of public debt in a closed production economy where a benev-
olent government chooses fiscal policies, including haircuts on its outstanding debt, in a
discretionary manner. Government bonds are held by domestic agents to smooth con-
sumption over time and because they provide collateral and liquidity services. We charac-
terize a recursive equilibrium where public debt amounts to a sizeable fraction of output in
steady state and is nevertheless fully serviced by the government. In a calibrated economy,
steady state debt amounts to around 84% of output, the government’s default threshold is
at around 94% of output, and the haircut on outstanding debt at this threshold is around
40%. Both reputational costs of default and contemporaneous costs due to lost collateral
and liquidity are essential to generate these empirically plausible predictions.
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1 Introduction
The sustainability of sovereign debt has become a serious concern to investors and policy-
makers during the recent financial crisis. In Europe fears of sovereign default and the associated
rising borrowing costs have forced several countries to adopt severe fiscal austerity measures.
Similarly, concerns about the sustainability of public debt have featured prominently in the
debate on the fiscal cliff in the United States. They are also recurrent in Japan which faces the
highest debt-to-GDP ratio among OECD countries.
The countries referred to above are developed economies where a substantial fraction of gov-
ernment debt is held domestically. Indeed, the sustainability of a country’s sovereign debt when
creditors are mostly domestic agents rather than international investors is not well understood.
Empirical evidence on sovereign default incentives in such a situation is scarce. Theoretical aca-
demic work has mainly focused on the sustainability of external debt in developing economies –
the empirically relevant case before the crisis. Against this background, the present paper seeks
to contribute to the understanding of internal debt sustainability by studying the government’s
default incentives in a dynamic closed economy.
Our core framework is the standard model of optimal fiscal policy under discretion, pioneered
by Lucas and Stokey (1983). We amend this core model by allowing the government to decide,
in each period, on the fraction of outstanding debt it repays. Moreover, we introduce financial
frictions. Firms must finance their wage bill in advance using collateralized loans; and the scale
of profitable investment projects is limited by entrepreneurs’ access to external finance. The
existence of these frictions generates a role for government debt as collateral and, when it is
tradable on a secondary market, as private liquidity.
Government revenue can only be generated by means of distortionary taxation, which gives
rise to a time-consistency problem that manifests itself in two ways. First, since sovereign
default effectively works as a lump-sum levy on households, there is an incentive for the govern-
ment to default on its inherited liabilities unless such default is associated with costs. Second,
the government’s desire to minimize the interest payments on outstanding debt leads to an
interest rate manipulation motive, which uniquely pins down the long-run level of debt. Key
to this motive is the fact that public debt is priced not by risk-neutral international investors,
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but by domestic agents with finite intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
We analyze the implications of the government’s lack of commitment in two steps. We first
consider the case where the government decides sequentially about taxation, spending and its
debt policy, but maintain the assumption that the government is committed to fully honor its
outstanding debt. This allows us to uncover fundamental properties of optimal government
policies in the face of the collateral and liquidity frictions constraining private agents, and to
study the determination of steady state debt. In particular, we show that the steady state
level of debt in our model is strictly positive, unlike in models which abstract from financial
constraints and predict negative or zero long-run debt (Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala,
2002; Debortoli and Nunes, 2013).
In a second step, we consider the case where the government’s lack of intertemporal com-
mitment also extends to the repayment of its debt. Two central features of our model, which
differentiate our work from most previous research on sovereign default, are that government
debt is held domestically and that we allow for fractional repayment rather than a binary de-
fault decision.1 This changes the nature as well as the costs of government default. That debt
is held by domestic agents implies that sovereign default does not involve a resource transfer
between the domestic economy and the rest of the world but instead between the government
and the private sector. That default can take the form of a fractional repayment implies that
the government’s optimal haircut decision will be determined endogenously such as to balance
marginal benefits and costs of that policy.
We characterize optimal policies in a recursive equilibrium where the government defaults
if its inherited debt exceeds an endogenously determined threshold level. Since public debt
plays an essential role as collateral and as a source of liquidity, default leads to repercussions
for financial intermediation. In detail, by reducing the amount of public debt available as
collateral and liquidity, default induces costs that are proportional to the size of the haircut.
Moreover, in line with the open-economy literature on sovereign debt (e.g. Arellano, 2008),
we assume that default is also associated with fixed costs that result from the government’s
1Both features have empirical support: On the basis of historical data for the period 1900-2010, Reinhart
and Rogoff (2011) report that domestic debt accounts for about two thirds of overall public debt, and for even
more in advanced economies. Cruces and Trebesch (2013) study sovereign debt restructurings between 1970
and 2010 and find an average sovereign haircut of 37%.
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temporary exclusion from the bond market. During this period, outstanding bonds can no
longer be traded on the secondary market and thus lose their liquidity value. Whereas the
government is excluded from the primary bond market, it can still sell debt in the form of
loans. Accordingly, in line with empirical evidence, the government is not forced to run a
balanced budget during the exclusion spell. Loans to the government constitute pledgeable
collateral, but – owing to their non-tradability – they do not provide liquidity. The government
balances the costs of default against the additional tax distortions under full repayment. Since
the latter are increasing in debt, there is a maximum sustainable level of debt, corresponding
to more than 90% of output in our calibrated economy. For levels of debt in excess of this fiscal
limit, the discretionary government optimally decides to exercise its default option. At the
fiscal limt, the implied haircut is at about 40%. For higher levels of debt, the optimal haircut
grows in line with the level of debt, resulting in a constant post-default level of debt.
Our model shares its focus on debt sustainability with the vast literature on sovereign debt
and default. Following the seminal approach to international lending and sovereign default
by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), quantitative models have analyzed the dynamics of sovereign
debt and default in small open economies (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2008). There,
debt is held externally, fiscal policy is largely absent, governments decide about default in a
discretionary fashion, and costs of default are exogenous. Notable recent exceptions include the
studies by Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) who examine the role of fiscal policy, Mendoza
and Yue (2012) who assess business cycle implications in an environment with endogenous
default costs, and Adam and Grill (2012) who analyze optimal sovereign default as the solution
to a Ramsey plan. D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2012) and Juessen and Schabert (2012) analyze
the incentives for default on domestic debt. However, different from our paper, D’Erasmo
and Mendoza (2012) focus on redistributive implications, while Juessen and Schabert (2012)
consider a setup with risk neutral agents and exogenous default costs. Finally, Sosa-Padilla
(2012) considers a framework with both external and domestic debt, where households face a
static decision problem, domestic debt is held by risk neutral bankers, and the default decision
is binary.
Our model emphasizes the role of endogenous default costs in the presence of financial
frictions that can be mitigated by the issuance of public debt. This latter feature connects
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our paper to models with incomplete markets in the tradition of Aiyagari (1994). In this vein,
Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) show how public debt can help to relax
financial constraints, while Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Angeletos, Collard, Dellas,
and Diba (2013) explore implications for optimal policy under commitment. Brutti (2011) and
Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2013) study sovereign default in three-period economies where
sovereign default destroys firms’ ability to insure against idiosyncratic shocks or the balance
sheets of domestic banks, respectively. They find that financial frictions can render sizeable
government debt levels sustainable even in the absence of reputational costs of default. Our
paper examines the long-run implications of financial frictions on the government’s default
incentives in a fully dynamic environment, showing that reputational (fixed) costs of default
are critical to generate sustainability of public debt in infinite horizon economies with fractional
default.
Methodologically, our work is related to a number of recent papers invoking the optimal
policy paradigm to study the determination of public debt under optimal discretionary fis-
cal policy. In a model without capital and with exogenous government expenditure, Krusell,
Martin, and Rios-Rull (2006) uncover a multiplicity of steady states that are similar to those
under full commitment. Considering endogenous government expenditure instead, Debortoli
and Nunes (2013) establish convergence to zero long-run debt as a robust outcome driven by
the government’s interest rate manipulation motive. Our model nests their economy as a spe-
cial case and inherits a generalized interest rate manipulation motive as an important force
shaping the conduct of policy. Finally, in models with capital, public debt under discretionary
fiscal policy has recently been studied by Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2008) and Ortigueira,
Pereira, and Pichler (2012), among others.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our model economy. In
Section 3 we examine optimal discretionary fiscal policy under the assumption of commitment
to full debt repayment. In Section 4 we present our main results allowing for strategic default.
We conclude in Section 5.
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2 The Model
Our model builds upon the Lucas-Stokey real production economy with endogenous govern-
ment spending studied by Debortoli and Nunes (2013). We extend their model by introducing
financial frictions, which generate a role for public debt as a source of collateral and liquidity,
and by allowing for outright default on government debt in the form of a fractional repayment
decision. The economy is populated by households, firms and a government. There is a single
non-storable output good, which is either consumed by households or transformed at a unitary
rate into a public good by the government. Time is discrete.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of measure one of identical, infinitely-lived households. The preferences
of a representative household j ∈ [0, 1] are given by
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cjt , 1− njt , gt), (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a time discount factor, cjt and njt denote consumption and labor effort of
household j, and gt denotes the level of public good provision. The period utility function u(·) is
assumed to be additively separable in its three arguments and twice continuously differentiable,
with partial derivatives uc > 0, ucc < 0, ul > 0, ull ≤ 0, ug > 0 and ugg ≤ 0.
Each household is composed of three types of members: workers, bankers and entrepreneurs.2
Workers supply labor to competitive firms; the other agents either become bankers or get
access to an entrepreneurial investment technology. The assignment to these two activities is
stochastic; an individual agent becomes banker with probability 1 − θ and entrepreneur with
probability θ, respectively.
Household j enters period t with a stock of bjt government bonds. Initially, all bonds are
held by bankers and entrepreneurs, with each of them holding the same amount bjt . Then, the
household members separate, and individuals learn their type (banker or entrepreneur) before
the government’s policy decisions are announced.
2Each household comprises a continuum [0, 1] of workers and a continuum [0, 1] of agents who become either
bankers or entrepreneurs.
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Competitive firms and bankers
There is a continuum of measure one of perfectly competitive firms that take prices and wages
as given. They have access to a production technology that transforms labor services into
consumption goods at a unitary rate. Specifically, the technology allows the representative
firm to produce
y1t = n˜t, (2)
where n˜t denotes labor hired by the firm. Production is subject to a moral hazard problem
which, in the absence of monitoring, makes it impossible for firms to pledge funds to workers and
outside creditors. Firms must therefore finance their wage bill in advance, and they can do so
using intra-period loans from financial intermediaries (bankers), who act as delegated monitors.
In order to meet the firms’ working capital requirement, bankers issue deposits contracts, dt, to
outside creditors (i.e., to workers from households other than their own; cf. Gertler and Karadi,
2011). However, although banks have a greater capacity to pledge funds to outside creditors,
they are also subject to moral hazard. They can therefore only issue deposits if they are able to
post collateral to cover at least a fraction ξc ∈ (0, 1) of the amount issued. Government bonds
are the sole source of collateral available to bankers, such that the collateral constraint facing
a representative banker from household j is given by
djt ≤
ρtb
j
t
ξc
, (3)
where djt denotes the deposits issued and ρt denotes the repayment rate on government bonds
(see below). Note that the timing assumption underlying the collateral constraint (3) implies
that the collateral can be seized by bank depositors at the end of the period when the bond price
is equal to the repayment rate. Note also that the banking sector is competitive, and hence
intra-period loans do not carry a positive interest rate unless the supply of loans is depressed
by the bankers’ availability of collateral. Aggregating across firms and bankers, equilibrium
in the bank-intermediated market for intra-period loans implies that the economy’s aggregate
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wage bill is constrained by
wtn˜t ≤ (1− θ)ρtbt
ξc
. (4)
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have access to a profitable investment technology. Specifically, they can invest in
projects that deliver a gross return R > 1 per unit of investment (both in consumption goods).
Denoting by Xjt the investment scale of the representative entrepreneur from household j, the
investment technology is characterized by
yj,2t = RX
j
t . (5)
Similar to the operation of banks, there is a moral hazard problem that limits entrepreneurs’
access to external finance. As a consequence, internal investment, xjt , is necessary to attract
external funds, ejt . External funds take the form of intra-period loans from workers and bankers
that pay zero interest as there is no discounting within the period. To raise the consumption
goods required for internal investment, entrepreneurs sell their liquid assets (government bonds)
on the secondary market; hence, xjt = ztb
j
t , where zt denotes the bond’s market price.
3 They
then augment their internal funds by acquiring external funds subject to the constraint
ejt ≤
xjt
ξl
, (6)
where ξl ∈ (0, 1). Constraint (6) is always binding when R > 1, resulting in an investment
scale of Xjt =
1+ξl
ξl
ztb
j
t per entrepreneur.
Aggregation
After production in the competitive and entrepreneurial sector has taken place, workers, bankers
and entrepreneurs transfer their earnings back to the household. Consumption-savings decisions
are then made at the household level; hence there is perfect consumption insurance within
3We assume that the secondary market for government debt is large enough to absorb the supply of bonds
from entrepreneurs. Formally, wtnt + (1−wt)n˜t ≥ θztbt, where variables without superscript denote economy-
wide aggregates.
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households.4 Aggregating over household members, the total income of household j in period
t is given by
Ijt = wtn
j
t + (1− wt)n˜jt + θ(R− 1)
1 + ξl
ξl
ztb
j
t . (7)
The first term on the right-hand side denotes the wage income earned by workers, the second
term denotes overall profits between firms and bankers in the competitive sector, and the third
term denotes entrepreneurs’ net return from investment. Note that (7) does not include income
from maturing government debt bjt .
2.2 The government
The government is benevolent and maximizes the utility (1) of the representative household.
Its policy tools are a proportional income tax τt, the level of public good provision gt, the
issuance of new debt Bt+1, and the repayment rate on outstanding government debt, ρt ∈ [0, 1].
The income tax is uniform across the different sources in (7); bond income is not taxed. The
government’s budget constraint reads
gt + ρtBt ≤ (1− τt)It + qtBt+1, (8)
where It denotes aggregate income in the private sector and qt denotes the price of a newly
issued government bond that promises one unit of beginning-of-period wealth in t + 1 but is
subject to default risk.
The government cannot commit to following a fixed policy path over time. It can, however,
make credible policy announcements within a given time period.5 The period-t government an-
nounces its current policy choices (τt, gt, Bt+1, ρt) before production takes place, but implements
these policies only afterwards, concurrent with households’ consumption-savings decisions. This
timing structure implies that the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-a`-vis the private sector.
Table 1 summarizes the timing of events in any given period t.
4This property allows us to introduce financial frictions while keeping an otherwise standard representative
agent framework (cf. Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
5Using the terminology of Ortigueira (2006), we assume intra-temporal commitment while abstracting from
inter-temporal commitment.
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Table 1: Timing of events in period t
1. The household endows each of its bankers and entrepreneurs with bt government bonds.
2. The household members separate and individual types (banker or entrepreneur) are
realized.
3. The government announces its policies (τt, gt, Bt+1, ρt).
4. Bankers issue deposits, dt, subject to collateral constraint (3) and make working capital
loans to the competitive firms. The firms hire labor, n˜t, subject to constraint (4). They
produce y1t = n˜t consumption goods.
5. Entrepreneurs sell their government bonds to raise internal funds, xt, and raise external
funds, et, from workers and bankers subject to external finance constraint (6). They
invest into projects of scale Xt = xt + et, which return y
2
t = RXt consumption goods.
6. The government collects income taxes τt, transforms gt units of the consumption good
into a public good, repays a fraction ρt of the maturing debt Bt and issues new debt
Bt+1. Households consume ct and purchase newly issued government debt, bt+1.
Our analysis of the policy problem faced by a government under discretion proceeds in two
steps. We first characterize optimal fiscal policies under the assumption that the government
can and does commit to fully honor its outstanding debt. We then examine the optimal fiscal
policy when the government has the option to default and study the sustainability of government
debt.
3 Full debt repayment
In this section we study optimal tax, spending and debt policies under the assumption that
the government commits to fully honor its outstanding debt, ρt = 1 for all t. This allows us to
isolate the effects of financial frictions on the model’s optimal policy prescriptions, particularly
the determination of government debt. We start by examining the optimal choices of households
for given fiscal policies.
3.1 Private-sector equilibrium
Households in our model are atomistic and take prices (wt, zt, qt)
∞
t=0 and policies (τt, gt, Bt+1)
∞
t=0
as given. They choose consumption, labor supply, labor demand, and savings to maximize
their objective function (1). Adopting recursive notation and dropping the superscript j, the
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optimization problem faced by the representative household reads
V˜ (b; τ, g, B) = max
c,n,n˜,b′
u(c, 1− n, g) + βV˜ (b′; τ ′, g′, B′)
−λ
(
c+ qb′ − (1− τ)
[
wn+ (1− w)n˜t + θ(R− 1)1 + ξ
l
ξl
zb
]
− b
)
−µ
(
wn˜− (1− θ)b
ξc
)
.
The first-order conditions are
ul
uc
= (1− τ)w, (9)
µ = (1− τ)uc(1− w)
w
≥ 0, (10)
q = β
u′c
uc
{
1 + (1− τ ′)
[
z′θ
(R− 1)(1 + ξl)
ξl
+ (1− θ)(1− w
′)
ξcw′
]}
. (11)
Condition (9) equates the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to the
net wage. Condition (10) shows that the collateral constraint, if it is binding (µ > 0), creates a
wedge between the wage and the marginal product of labor; thus, whenever collateral is scarce,
competitive bankers earn positive profits. The Euler equation (11) highlights the three roles
played by government bonds in our model: (i) bonds allow households to shift consumption
over time; (ii) bonds provide liquidity and hence allow households to increase entrepreneurial
investment; and (iii) bonds are a source of collateral to bankers.
Note that in a private-sector equilibrium, since there is no discounting within the time
period, the beginning-of-period price of a government bond must equal its repayment rate,
that is, z = ρ = 1 in all periods. Introducing the liquidity premium pi and the collateral
premium φ,
pi = θ(1− τ)(R− 1)1 + ξ
l
ξl
, (12)
φ = (1− θ)(1− τ)(1− w)
wξc
, (13)
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we can thus write Euler equation (11) as
q = β
u′c
uc
(1 + pi′ + φ′) . (14)
Labor market clearing implies n˜ = n in a symmetric equilibrium, such that the household’s
budget constraint reads
c+ qb′ = (1− τ)n+ [1 + (1− τ)r] b,
where r = θ(R − 1)1+ξl
ξl
. Eliminating the tax rate τ and the bond price q using (9) and (14),
this expression can be rearranged as
ucc+ βu
′
c(1 + pi
′ + φ′)b′ =
ul
w
n+ uc(1 + pi)b. (15)
Finally, note that bond market clearing requires that B = b in a private-sector equilibrium.
3.2 Optimal fiscal policy
Under our maintained assumption of lack of commitment, the government in a given time
period can choose policy variables for that period but it cannot control policy variables for
the future. To characterize the optimal policies we adopt a primal approach. Accordingly, the
incumbent government directly chooses consumption c, labor n, and debt issuance b′ for the
current period, taking as given the policy rules {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ} employed by future governments, and
subject to the requirement that its choices are consistent with a private-sector equilibrium.
Inspection of implementability constraint (15) shows that, when ρ = ρ′ = 1, the aggregate
state vector in our model consists of only one variable, b. The policy rules {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ} are thus
of the form c = cˆ(b), n = nˆ(b), and b′ = bˆ(b). Via equations (9), (12) and (13), these rules
further imply decision rules for the tax rate, τˆ(b), the liquidity premium, pˆi(b), and the collateral
premium, φˆ(b), respectively. Plugging these functions into Euler equation (14), we can write
the bond pricing function Q as
Q(uc, b
′) = β
uc(cˆ(b
′))
uc
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
. (16)
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Note that, as households have a finite intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the bond price
depends on the current and future marginal utility of consumption.6 Finally, note that the wage
rate falls below labor productivity if firms’ access to working capital loans is strictly constrained
by the bankers’ pledgeable collateral. This allows us to write the wage rate as a function
ω(b, n) =
 1 if (1− θ)b > ξcn(1−θ)b
ξcn
otherwise.
(17)
Using the aggregate resource constraint to substitute for public consumption in the household
utility function (1), the discretionary government’s optimization problem under commitment
to full debt repayment is then given by
V (b) = max
c,n,b′
u(c, 1− n, n+ rb− c) + βV (b′) (18)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ(uc, b
′)b′ − ul
ω(b, n)
n− uc(1 + pi)b
)
,
where γ is a non-negative Lagrangian multiplier and V (b′) is the continuation value function.
3.3 Recursive equilibrium
We study the government’s optimal policy in a recursive equilibrium where agents choose their
actions sequentially. A formal definition of the equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 1. A recursive equilibrium under commitment to full debt repayment is a set of
policy functions {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}, a value function V and a bond pricing function Q such that:
(i) given the value function V and the bond pricing function Q, the policy functions {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}
solve the government’s optimization problem (18);
(ii) given the policy functions {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}, the bond pricing function Q satisfies (16);
6This property sets our model apart from related papers that determine bond prices on the basis of quasi-
linear utility; see e.g., Juessen and Schabert (2012) and Sosa-Padilla (2012) who also consider environments
with domestic debt. Similarly, in models of externally held debt, bonds are generally priced by risk neutral
international investors.
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(iii) given the policy functions {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}, the value function satisfies the Bellman equation
V (b) = u(cˆ(b), 1− nˆ(b), nˆ(b) + rb− cˆ(b)) + βV (bˆ(b)).
The first-order conditions characterizing the policy functions in a recursive equilibrium under
full debt repayment are presented in the Appendix. Of particular interest is the generalized
Euler equation (GEE) characterizing the optimal debt policy. It is given by
γ′
{
u′c(1 + pi
′)− u
′
ln
′
(w′)2
ω′1
}
− u′gr = γu′c(1 + pi′ + φ′) {1 + εqb′} , (19)
where εqb′ denotes the elasticity of the bond price q with respect to changes in debt issuance
b′.7 The GEE equates the marginal cost of entering the next period with a higher stock
of outstanding debt to the marginal benefit of relaxing implementability constraint (15) via
issuing additional debt. For an economy without any role for government debt as collateral or
liquidity, the case studied by Debortoli and Nunes (2013), the GEE simplifies to
γ′ = γ
(
1 + εqb′
)
. (20)
A steady state in their model is hence characterized by either γ∗ = 0 or εqb′
∗ = 0. The first
case corresponds to an undistorted steady state where the government holds enough assets to
implement the first-best allocation. The second case corresponds to a distorted steady state
where either Q∗2 = 0, such that the bond price is locally invariant to changes in debt, or b
∗ = 0,
such that changes of the bond price do not have budgetary effects.
Debortoli and Nunes (2013) show with a simple analytical example, as well as more general
numerical examples, that steady states with b∗ = 0 and cˆb(b∗) > 0, that is, a locally increasing
consumption policy function, are generic in their economy.8 This result is rooted in the interest
rate manipulation motive faced by the government under lack of commitment. To understand
the underlying intuition, note first that the bond pricing function in the absence of collateral
7Formally, εqb′ =
Q2(uc,b
′)b′
Q(uc,b′)
= ucc(b
′)
uc(b′)
cˆb(b
′)b′ + (
pˆib(b
′)+φˆb(b′))b′
(1+pˆi(b′)+φˆ(b′))
.
8Key to the emergence of an increasing consumption policy function is the fact that government expenditure
is endogenous.
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or liquidity premia is simply given by
Q(uc, b
′) = β
uc(b
′)
uc
. (21)
Accordingly, an increase in current consumption c raises q and thus reduces the interest rate on
newly issued debt. At the same time, if the change was anticipated, it reduces the bond price
one period in advance, q−1. A government choosing an optimal policy path takes the effects
in both time periods into account. A discretionary government, however, takes q−1 as given.
Ignoring the (adverse) effect of a higher c on the past bond price q−1, it chooses a higher level
of consumption than prescribed by the optimal policy path.
Moreover, the incumbent government correctly foresees that its successor faces the same
discretionary incentive to increase consumption. It therefore seeks to influence its successor’s
behavior via manipulation of the future state variable b′; it issues debt such as to induce the
future government to decrease future consumption cˆ(b′). Given a consumption policy function
that is increasing in debt, cˆb(b
′) > 0, this is achieved by decumulating debt. The incentive
to decumulate debt is a recurrent phenomenon as long as there is a positive stock of debt
outstanding, such that a steady state finally emerges at b∗ = 0.
In our generalized model, where government bonds provide liquidity and collateral services,
the zero long-run debt result no longer obtains. Instead, a positive steady state level of debt
emerges generically.
Proposition 1. If government bonds provide liquidity services, r > 0, or production in the
competitive sector is subject to a collateral constraint, ξc > 0, the steady state features a strictly
positive level of government debt, b∗ > 0.
Under a collateral role for government debt, positive steady state debt emerges by construction,
for otherwise zero debt would imply zero production. However, a positive steady state level of
debt emerges already if there is only a liquidity role but no collateral role for public debt. The
intuition behind this finding is best understood as follows. If public debt has a role as private
liquidity, the bond price includes a liquidity premium,
Q(uc, b
′) = β
uc(b
′)
uc
(1 + pˆi(b′)). (22)
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The current government again seeks to increase current bond prices q via manipulation of the
future state b′. This is now achieved for changes in b′ which induce an increase in u′c (1 + pi
′).
While u′c is decreasing in cˆ(b
′), the opposite is true for the liquidity premium since pic =
−pi ucc
uc
> 0. Accordingly, there are conflicting motives for the manipulation of cˆ(b′) because,
given cˆb(b
′) > 0, a decumulation of debt increases future marginal utility u′c but decreases the
future liquidity premium pi′. These conflicting motives balance each other at a positive level of
debt.
The finding of positive steady state debt might suggest that the accumulation of moderate
levels of debt has positive welfare effects. The following Proposition examines this property.
Proposition 2. The accumulation of moderate levels of debt has positive welfare effects if the
return to investment in the entrepreneurial sector is sufficiently high,
r >
uc
ul
(
1− ul
ug
ul
ug
− ull
ul
n
)
, (23)
or production in the competitive sector is subject to a collateral constraint, ξc > 0. Conversely,
if r = 0 and ξc = 0, social welfare is monotonically decreasing in debt.
For the government’s value function to be increasing in debt, the marginal benefit from a
relaxation of the collateral constraint and/or from increased liquidity must exceed the marginal
cost from increased taxation. In models of optimal fiscal policy under discretion, the marginal
cost from taxation is generally increasing in the level of debt, suggesting that the value function
in our model is of an inverted U-shape. Our numerical results presented in the following Section
confirm this conjecture.
3.4 A calibrated economy
We now study optimal discretionary fiscal policy in a calibrated economy. The purpose of this
exercise is to illustrate the key quantitative properties of optimal fiscal policy in a plausible
economic environment.
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Calibration
We consider an instantaneous utility function u that is additively separable and allows for
curvature in all its arguments,
u(c, 1− n, g) = (1− ωg)
[
ωc
c1−σc − 1
1− σc + (1− ωc)
(1− n)1−σl − 1
1− σl
]
+ ωg
g1−σg − 1
1− σg , (24)
where ωc and ωg denote preference weights on private and public consumption and σc, σl and
σg are elasticities. The parameter values are selected as follows. The three elasticities σc, σl
and σg are each set to the value 2, which is in the middle of the parameter range typically
considered in the macroeconomic literature. The preference weights are chosen such that, in
the model’s steady state, g∗/c∗ = 0.25 and n∗ = 0.3; the resulting values are ωc = 0.15 and
ωg = 0.015. The collateral parameter is set to ξ
c = 0.4, corresponding to a leverage ratio
of 2.5. The parameter θ governs the relative importance of production in the competitive
and entrepreneurial sectors. Beyond that, the parameters R, θ and ξl matter only jointly, as
determinants of the return to entrepreneurial investment, r. The individual parameter values
are selected in line with evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). As discussed in
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), the SCF reports a median of the distribution of capital
gains in private business investment of roughly 7%. This motivates our choice of r = 0.07. For
simplicity, we set θ = 0.25 and ξl = ξc = 0.4, implying R = 1 + rξ
l
θ(1+ξl)
= 1.08. Finally, we
choose the discount factor β = 0.92 to match an annual risk-free real interest rate of about 3%
in the presence of a steady state liquidity premium. Our parameter choices are summarized in
Table 2. For given parameters, we solve the model numerically, using a combination of standard
projection and dynamic programming techniques.9 In the following we present results for the
model’s steady state, policy functions and the social welfare function.
Steady state
The steady state values of key endogenous variables are presented in Table 3. Output in the
competitive sector is roughly equal to y1
∗
= 0.3, in line with our calibration target. Value
added in the entrepreneurial sector is significantly smaller, y2
∗
= 0.019, such that total output
9Details on our computational algorithm and the computer code are available upon request.
17
Table 2: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
σc 2 elasticity of private consumption
σg 2 elasticity of public consumption
σl 2 elasticity of leisure
ωc 0.15 weight of consumption (priv.+publ.) vs. leisure
ωg 0.015 weight of public vs. private consumption
ξc 0.4 inverse of leverage ratio
r 0.07 private equity premium
θ 0.25 share of entrepreneurial investors
ξl 0.4 inverse of leverage ratio
R 1.08 gross return on investment projects
β 0.92 discount factor
is given by y∗ = 0.3220. Private and public consumption amount to 80% and 20% of total
output, respectively (c∗ = 0.2578, g∗ = 0.0642). The steady state level of debt is positive, in
line with Proposition 1. In particular, our parameter choices imply a sizeable steady state debt
level of b∗ = 0.2712, which corresponds to a debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 84%. The steady state
bond price q∗ = 0.97 implies an annual interest rate close to our calibration target of 3%. The
steady state tax rate is τ ∗ = 22.5%. Finally, the collateral constraint is not binding at the
steady state, and the wage rate is thus equal to labor productivity, w∗ = 1. Accordingly, the
main driver behind the positive level of steady state debt is its liquidity role.
Table 3: Steady state values
Variable Steady state
y1 0.3030
y2 0.0190
y 0.3220
c 0.2578
g 0.0642
b 0.2712
b/y 0.8422
q 0.9699
τ 0.2248
w 1.0000
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Policy functions and welfare
The optimal policy functions, displayed in Figure 1, are highly non-linear with kinks in the
region of the state space where the collateral constraint kicks in. In fact, we can partition the
state space B = [b, b¯] into three regions that differ in how optimal policies react to variations
in the inherited debt level. In the first region, B1 = [b, b1), debt is so low that the collateral
constraint is strictly binding. In the second region, B2 = [b1, b2), the collateral constraint is non-
binding under optimal policies, but its existence nevertheless affects the government’s optimal
policy trade-offs. In the third region, B3 = [b2, b¯], the collateral constraint has no distortionary
effects on optimal policies.10
We now describe each region in detail, starting with B3. A first observation is that the steady
state b∗ is contained in this region. Public debt thus converges to a level that is sufficient to
fully satiate the demand for collateral. Indeed, the optimal policy coincides with the one that
would obtain in an otherwise identical model without collateral constraint (ξc = 0). The wage
rate is constant and equal to labor productivity, w = 1. Labor supply and public consumption
are monotonically decreasing in debt. By contrast, private consumption and the bond price are
non-monotonic; they are decreasing in b for relatively low levels of debt in B3 and increasing in
b for high levels of debt. In particular, we have cˆb(b
∗) > 0. A reverse pattern is found for the
tax rate, which reflects the government’s effort to sustain liquidity premia pi = (1−τ)r and thus
bond prices. The debt policy function is increasing in b with a slope below one, indicating that
the steady state b∗ is stable. Finally, throughout B3, social welfare is monotonically decreasing
in b. This illustrates that the adverse tax distortion effect resulting from a higher level of
indebtedness dominates the positive liquidity effect.
In region B2 the collateral constraint is still non-binding under optimal policies, but its
existence already distorts the optimal policy trade-off. In particular, the government relies
more on taxation relative to debt issuance to finance public spending. In doing so, it depresses
labor supply and prevents the collateral constraint from becoming binding. Hence, taxation
is attractive relative to debt issuance because the income tax does not distort the equilibrium
labor allocation. This is because, even under lower taxes, labor would still be depressed by the
10In our calibrated economy, b1 = 0.1745 and b2 = 0.1800, which corresponds to approximately 54% and 56%
of steady state output, respectively.
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Figure 1: Policy functions under commitment to full debt repayment
(a) Welfare (b) Wage rate
(c) Consumption (d) Public spending
(e) Labor (f) Tax rate
(g) Bond price (h) Debt issuance
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scarcity of pledgeable collateral.
Finally, in region B1 the collateral constraint is strictly binding. The scarcity of collateral
constrains labor demand, such that the market clearing wage rate falls short of labor produc-
tivity (w < 1) and output, private consumption and public consumption are depressed. Since
the collateral constraint is less stringent the higher the initial debt stock, the policy functions
nˆ, wˆ, cˆ and gˆ are increasing in b. The same is true for the equilibrium bond price under the
optimal debt policy.
The debt Laffer curve
Inspection of the debt policy function bˆ allows for the further observation that, independent of
the initial debt stock, the government always issues an amount of bonds that is sufficient to
ensure a non-binding collateral constraint in the future. To understand the intuition behind
this finding, first note that the social welfare function has an inverted U-shape as prescribed by
Proposition 2. Specifically, the welfare function is initially upward-sloping in region B1, where
the collateral constraint is strictly binding, and later downward-sloping. Given this inverted
U-shape, for each possible choice b′ ∈ B1 there hence exists an alternative choice b˜′ > b′ such
that V (b˜′) = V (b′). Since b′ and b˜′ deliver the same continuation payoff to the government,
a necessary condition for b′ to be optimal is to generate a higher current revenue from debt
creation compared to b˜′. Formally, given the optimal choice of current consumption, c = cˆ(b),
the debt issuance b′ can be an optimal choice only if Q(uc, b′)b′ > Q(uc, b˜′)b˜′. Figure 2 shows that
Figure 2: Welfare and the debt Laffer curve
(a) Value function (b) Revenue from debt issuance
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this is generically not the case in our calibrated economy. In particular, the figure shows that
debt choices b′ ∈ B1 generate a lower current revenue than the corresponding choices b˜′ ∈ B3.11
This pattern reflects an underlying debt Laffer curve – a situation where a marginal increase
in the quantity of debt issued is associated with a reduction in the revenue for the government
from that operation. Facing declining bond prices Q(uc, b
′) associated with suboptimal, low
choices of b′ ∈ B1, the government thus responds by an aggressive debt policy in order to escape
the Laffer curve region.12
4 Fractional default
We now examine the properties of optimal fiscal policy when the government does no longer
commit to full debt repayment. Instead, it decides in a discretionary manner on the fraction
ρ ∈ [0, 1] of outstanding debt it repays. Our focus is on the optimal fractional default decision
and the maximum level of debt that can be sustained without default in equilibrium.
Understanding the optimal discretionary repayment policy requires consideration of the costs
of default. There are two dimensions to these costs in our model. First, in line with much of the
sovereign debt literature, we assume that there are reputational costs. Following a default, the
government is excluded from the primary bond market, and outstanding bonds can no longer
be traded on the secondary market.13 The duration of the market exclusion is stochastic;
with a constant probability α an excluded government can re-access the bond market in the
next period. Unlike most of the literature, however, we assume that during the bond market
exclusion the government can still sell debt in the form of loans.14 The difference between
11As an example, consider an inherited level of debt b = 0.1 and the two alternative debt choices b′ = 0.15 and
b˜′ = 0.22. These two choices deliver the exact same continuation welfare level V (0.15) = V (0.22) = −12.5685.
Yet, the current revenue from issuing b˜′ = 0.22 exceeds the current revenue from issuing b′ = 0.15 for all possible
values of c, including the optimal one at c ≈ 0.23.
12Formally, the marginal revenue from issuing additional debt b′ is given by dQ(uc,b
′)b′
db′ = Q(uc, b
′) {1 + εqb′}.
Accordingly, there is a debt Laffer curve whenever εqb′ < −1. From the GEE (19), −Vb(b′) = γu′c(1 + pi′ +
φ′) {1 + εqb′}. Since γu′c(1 + pi′ + φ′) > 0, it follows that Vb(b′) > 0 if and only if εqb′ < −1. Hence, an aggressive
debt policy that escapes the Laffer curve region implies a level of future debt such that Vb(b
′) < 0.
13Consistent with this assumption is the empirical evidence presented in Bai, Julliard, and Yuan (2012).
These authors analyze Eurozone sovereign bond markets in the period 2006-2012 and find that secondary
market liquidity has been significantly reduced during the recent crisis, with markets basically drying up in
countries that received a bailout (Greece and Portugal).
14Note that the complete exclusion also from the primary market for debt considered in the literature (cf.
Arellano, 2008) has the counterfactual implication of zero outstanding debt following a default.
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bonds and loans lies in their tradability on the secondary market. While bonds are readily
marketable, loans must be held to maturity. Loans can thus be used as collateral by bankers
in the same way as government bonds, but they are not a source of liquidity for entrepreneurs.
Second, there are further contemporaneous costs associated with a default, since a haircut
on bonds reduces the amount of pledgeable collateral available to private agents. If the haircut
is large enough such as to make the bankers’ collateral constraint binding, this induces output
losses in the competitive sector. Note that the costs via reduced collateral depend on the size
of the implemented haircut, whereas the repercussions of market exclusion are of a fixed cost
nature.
4.1 Optimal fiscal policy
It is convenient to cast the incumbent government’s optimal policy problem under the option
to default as a two stage decision problem. The government first decides whether or not to
repay the entirety of its outstanding debt. Conditional on this decision, the government then
chooses its relevant policy instruments.
Optimal policies under the option to default depend not only on the level of the government’s
outstanding debt. Instead, it is also payoff-relevant whether maturing debt is in the form of
bonds or loans and whether the government can issue bonds or not. We capture this by an
indicator variable s ∈ {f, a, e}, where f indicates that bond markets are fully operational
(i.e., both maturing and new government debt is in the form of bonds), a indicates that the
government has only loans outstanding but can issue bonds on the primary market, and e
indicates that the government is and remains excluded from the bond market.15
Define V of (b) as the value function for a government that has the option to default and starts
the current period with b outstanding bonds. This value function satisfies
V of (b) = max{V ndf (b), V df (b)}, (25)
where V ndf (b) is the value conditional on full repayment (ρ = 1) and V
d
f (b) is the value condi-
15There is no need to consider mixed portfolios consisting of bonds and loans: Since bonds carry a liquidity
premium, the government prefers to issue debt in the form of bonds whenever this is possible. The underlying
pricing functions for bonds and loans are formally presented in the Appendix.
23
tional on partial default (ρ < 1). The no-default value function is the solution to
V ndf (b) = max
c,n,b′
u(c, 1− n, n+ rb− c) + βV of (b′) (26)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
b(uc, b
′)b′ − ul
ω(b, n)
n− uc(1 + pi)b
)
,
where ω(b, n) and Qb(uc, b
′) are the pricing functions for labor and newly issued bonds, respec-
tively. Similar to bonds, loans promise one unit of consumption in the next period; they also
serve as collateral but owing to their non-tradability offer no liquidity services. The govern-
ment’s value function under default is hence given by
V df (b) = max
ρ∈[0,1]
V˜ d(ρb), (27)
where
V˜ d(ρb) = max
c,n,`′
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βW o(`′) (28)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
`(uc, `
′)`′ − ul
ω(ρb, n)
n− ucρb
)
is the value function conditional on a given repayment rate ρ < 1, and `′ and Q`(uc, `′) denote
newly issued loans and the underlying pricing function, respectively. This formulation makes
clear that what ultimately matters for allocations and welfare is the effective state ρb. Since
this state can be regulated via the repayment policy ρ subject to ρb ≤ b, the value function
V df (b) is necessarily non-decreasing over the entire state space. Specifically, V
d
f (b) is increasing
whenever the optimal default policy prescribes full debt repayment, and constant whenever
the optimal default policy prescribes partial default. Finally, W o(`) is the value function of a
government that starts the period with ` outstanding loans,
W o(`) = αmax{W nda (`),W d(`)}+ (1− α) max{W nde (`),W d(`)}, (29)
where W nda (`) is the value function conditional on full repayment of a government that regains
access to the bond market in the beginning of the period, W nde (`) is the no-default value function
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of a government that remains excluded from the bond market, and W d(`) is the value function
conditional on default. These functions satisfy
W nda (`) = max
c,n,b′
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βV of (b′) (30)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
b(uc, b
′)b′ − ul
ω(`, n)
n− uc`
)
,
W nde (`) = max
c,n,`′
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βW o(`′) (31)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
`(uc, `
′)`′ − ul
ω(`, n)
n− uc`
)
,
W d(`) = max
ρ∈[0,1]
W˜ d(ρ`), (32)
where W˜ d(ρ`) denotes the value function conditional on a given repayment rate ρ on loans,
W˜ d(ρ`) = max
c,n,`′
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βW o(`′) (33)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
`(uc, `
′)`′ − ul
ω(ρ`, n)
n− ucρ`
)
.
It is not necessary to index W d(`) by a or e, since default precludes the current government’s
option of immediate bond market access. Moreover, because default hampers the liquidity of
maturing bonds, the value of defaulting is independent of whether outstanding liabilities are
in the form of bonds or loans, that is, V df (x) = W
d(x) and V˜ d(x) = W˜ d(x), where x denotes
the (effective) amount of outstanding liabilities. Finally, note also that W nde (`) = W˜
d(ρ`) for
ρ = 1. Accordingly, W nde (`) = W
d(`) whenever the optimal default policy prescribes full debt
repayment.
4.2 Recursive equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium under the option to default can be defined analogous to Definition 1.
This is conceptually straightforward but requires cumbersome notation, and hence we relegate
the formal equilibrium definition to the Appendix.
In a recursive equilibrium under the option to default, the government fully repays its out-
standing bonds if V ndf (b) ≥ V d(b). Similarly, it fully repays its outstanding loans if W nds (`) ≥
W n(`), where the indicator s ∈ {a, e} makes clear that this decision may depend on whether
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the government regains market access. When the government defaults, its optimal repayment
decision is given by ρˆf (b) = arg maxρ V˜
d(ρb) and ρˆs(`) = arg maxρ W˜
d(ρ`), s ∈ {a, e}, respec-
tively.
Inspection of the government’s policy problems in Section 4.1 allows us to derive further
characteristics of the equilibrium default decision. Under the premise that the welfare functions
conditional on no default are either monotonically decreasing or of an inverse U-shape,16 the
following result obtains.
Proposition 3. In a recursive equilibrium under the option to default, the government defaults
if and only if its inherited debt exceeds a threshold level that depends on the form of outstanding
liabilities and the government’s access to the primary bond market. Specifically, there exist
default thresholds ¯`de <
¯`d
a < b¯
d
f such that the optimal repayment policy is characterized by
ρˆf (b) =
 1 if b ≤ b¯dfx/b if b > b¯df , and ρˆs(`) =
 1 if ` ≤ ¯`dsx/` if ` > ¯`ds ,
where s ∈ {a, e} and x is the lowest level of effective debt that maximizes post-default welfare,
x = arg maxx V˜
d(x). At x the collateral constraint is strictly binding.
The intuition behind this result is readily seen. Recall that the value functions conditional on
default are non-decreasing over the entire state space, and constant whenever the optimal policy
prescribes ρ < 1. Denote this constant level of welfare by V¯ d. Given the premise underlying
Proposition 3, the value functions conditional on full repayment are monotonically decreasing or
inverse U-shaped. Hence there exist unique default thresholds ¯`de <
¯`d
a < b¯
d
f , implicitly defined
by W nde (
¯`d
e) = V¯
d, W nda (
¯`d
a) = V¯
d and V ndf (b¯
d) = V¯ d, respectively. Moreover, due to the benefits
of having access to an operational bond market, V ndf (x) > W
nd
a (x) > W
nd
e (x) globally.
17 Hence,
¯`d
e <
¯`d
a < b¯
d
f .
More generally, Proposition 3 has two important implications. First, it establishes b¯df as
the maximum sustainable level of public debt; we denote this threshold by fiscal limit. Sec-
16Given the economic structure of our model, it is natural to expect this property to hold. Our numerical
results of Sections 3 and 4 confirm this; however, a formal proof is not available.
17The first inequality follows because the liquidity services of maturing bonds are valuable, ugr − γucpi =
r[ug − γul] > 0. The second inequality follows because, relative to loans, there is a liquidity premium on newly
issued bonds, Qb(uc, x
′) > Q`(uc, x′) for all x′ ∈ {b′, `′}.
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ond, the proposition makes clear that the optimal haircut reduces effective debt to the unique
level that maximizes post-default welfare. This post-default level of effective debt is given by
x = ¯`de regardless of the type of maturing debt and current bond market access. Moreover, as
a result of balancing the marginal benefits and costs of default, this level necessarily induces
a strictly binding collateral constraint. The role of public debt in providing collateral and liq-
uidity services is thus an important force in disciplining the discretionary government’s default
incentives. But a government that exercises its default option will always find it optimal to
make the post-default level of debt so scarce that financial intermediation is hampered.
4.3 A calibrated economy
We now explore the quantitative implications of the recursive equilibrium under the option
to default within the calibrated economy introduced in Section 3.4. The model parameters
are kept unchanged, as summarized in Table 2. In addition, we need to pin down the reentry
probability α. For our benchmark scenario we choose α = 0.5, which implies that, on average,
the bond market is impaired during the default period and the two following periods. The
implied duration of two years is consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Bai, Julliard,
and Yuan (2012), and it is also broadly in line with estimates reported in the sovereign debt
literature (cf. Cruces and Trebesch, 2013).
Figure 3 shows the value functions of the government under the option to default. The
top panel contrasts the government’s value function conditional on no default (V nd) and on
default (V d) when bond markets are fully operational. Under full repayment, the government’s
value function is of an inverse U-shape. Under partial default, it is monotonically increasing
for low levels of debt and constant from the threshold level x = 0.1705 onwards. The two
value functions intersect at the fiscal limit b¯df = 0.2975, which corresponds to roughly 94% of
steady state output. Importantly, b¯d > b∗, and hence the government fully repays its debt at
the steady state.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 contrasts the government’s value functions W nda , W
nd
e and W
d.
The two functions W nda and W
nd
e are again of an inverted U-shape, in line with our previous
discussion. Conditional on regaining market access, the government fully honors its debt up
to the point where W nda and W
d intersect, which corresponds to ¯`da = 0.2630 in our calibrated
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Figure 3: Value functions
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Figure 4: Default thresholds as a fraction of steady state output
economy. Finally, note that W nde (`) = W
d(`) if and only if debt is below x, and hence the
government under market exclusion fully honors its debt up to this threshold, ¯`de = x.
Figure 4 further illustrates how the three default thresholds {b¯df , ¯`da, ¯`de} depend on the mar-
ket re-access probability α. We observe that b¯df and
¯`d
a are both monotonically decreasing in α.
This reflects that a higher probability of market re-access lowers the cost of the bond market
exclusion triggered by default; hence, the maximum sustainable level of debt is reduced. Quan-
titatively, however, an increase in α above our benchmark of α = 0.5 has only relatively minor
consequences for the fiscal limit: expressed as a fraction of steady state output, it changes
from 94% for α = 0.5 to 89% for α = 0.9. Finally, the default threshold ¯`de is independent of
α because the government is already exluded from the bond market and thus incurs only the
contemporaneous costs due to the reduction in pledgeable collateral. At the threshold ¯`de these
costs exactly balance the benefits of default due to reduced tax distortions. As also the benefits
are independent of the re-access probability, so is the default threshold ¯`de.
Figure 5 presents the policy functions under the option to default for the scenario of a fully
operational bond market (s = f). For debt levels below the fiscal limit b¯df , these policy functions
mirror the ones in the economy with commitment to full debt repayment (cf. Figure 1). At
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the fiscal limit, there is a discontinuity, and for debt levels exceeding b¯df all policy functions
are constant. The repayment policy ρˆf (b) is an exception; as predicted in Proposition 3, it is
falling in b because the defaulting government always reduces effective debt to the same level,
ρˆf (b)b = x, independent of the initial level of b. The optimal haircut at the fiscal limit is about
40%. Also in line with Proposition 3, when the government defaults the collateral constraint
becomes strictly binding, such that the wage rate drops below labor productivity.
Government default affects the value of the assets held by private agents directly via the
reduced repayment and indirectly via the loss in their liquidity. Households respond to the
reduction in the value of their assets by increasing labor supply and reducing private consump-
tion,18 whereas the government responds to the reduction in its liabilities by increasing public
consumption. The higher level of public spending is financed via increased taxes. This is opti-
mal since the labor tax is hardly distortionary due to the binding collateral constraint, while
the government has to pay high interest rates on its newly issued debt. The high interest rate
emerges because, following default, the government is confined to finance itself via loans, which
do not carry a liquidity premium and are also subject to significant default risk.
This risk is apparent in the policy functions when outstanding debt takes the form of loans.
Figure 6 displays these policies, distinguishing between the situation when the government can
re-access the bond market (the blue solid line) and when it cannot (the green dashed line). The
top left panel shows the government’s repayment policy. If the government can re-access the
bond market, it partially defaults when debt exceeds the threshold ¯`da = 0.2630. If it cannot,
partial default occurs at all levels of debt exceeding ¯`de = 0.1705. Given the government’s debt
issuance policy, which prescribes debt issuance beyond the threshold ¯`de for all levels of initial
debt, extended periods of bond market exclusion are thus associated with serial default: the
government always partially defaults when it remains excluded from the bond market. Loans
therefore carry a significant default premium. However, once the government can re-access
the bond market, the economy converges to its steady state without further defaults occurring
during the transition.
18The wealth effect on labor supply associated with sovereign default is driven by the linear separable prefer-
ences in our calibrated economy. It may be overturned by considering GHH-preferences, as is often done in the
sovereign debt literature.
30
Figure 5: Policy functions under the option to default – bonds
(a) Repayment rate (b) Wage rate
(c) Consumption (d) Public spending
(e) Labor (f) Tax rate
(g) Price of new debt (h) Debt issuance
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Figure 6: Policy functions under the option to default – loans
(a) Repayment rate (b) Wage rate
(c) Consumption (d) Public spending
(e) Labor (f) Tax rate
(g) Price of new debt (h) Debt issuance
Note: The blue solid line corresponds to the optimal policy functions when the government regains access to
the primary bond market (s = a). The green dotted line corresponds to the optimal policy functions when the
government remains excluded (s = e).
32
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided a quantitative framework to study the joint determinants of government
debt and its sustainability in a closed economy subject to financial frictions. Fiscal policy is
implemented under lack of commitment, which may extend also to the repayment of maturing
government debt. Since debt is held domestically, it is valued as an instrument to smooth
consumption, but also as a source of collateral and liquidity. Our particular interest is in
three statistics for government debt: the steady state level, the maximum sustainable level
(fiscal limit), and the optimal haircut rescaling the effective amount of liabilities in case of
default. When default triggers the government’s temporary exclusion from the bond market, the
calibrated economy predicts empirically plausible outcomes for these three statistics. Another
interesting feature is the prediction of possibly extended periods of serial default by governments
without access to the bond market.
For our calibrated economy steady state debt is at approximately 84% of output, the default
threshold is at 94% of output, and the haircut imposed at this threshold is about 40%. Notably,
the full set of frictions invoked in our model is necessary to generate these empirically plausible
statistics. Our calibration, particularly that of the collateral parameter ξc, implies a demand
for collateral in the order of 50% of output. For higher levels of debt, the economy’s collateral
constraint is slack, which leaves the government facing a trade-off between the liquidity services
of increased debt and the associated tax distortions. The liquidity role of government debt is
therefore essential to generate a steady state with government liabilities in excess of the level
satiating the economy’s collateral constraint.
On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of debt the liquidity value of government
bonds tends to be dominated by the associated tax distortions, resulting in a downward-sloping
value function, Vb(b) < 0. However, since default via fractional repayment of maturing debt
amounts to rescaling the ‘effective level’ of debt, any level of debt such that Vb(b) < 0 is not
sustainable, unless there is some additional fixed cost of defaulting. The loss in liquidity due
to the government’s exclusion from the bond market is therefore critically needed in order to
sustain sizeable debt positions.19
19Debt-to-GDP ratios in the order of magnitude of 100% are sustainable under quite moderate average
exclusion durations (cf. Figure 4).
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Finally, under reasonable calibrations of the entrepreneurial return r but absent a demand
for collateral (ξc = 0), the value function under default is flat already for very low levels of debt.
Conditional on default occurring, this (counterfactual) scenario would induce the government
to impose a close to 100% haircut. Hence, the costs for production and welfare due to scarce
collateral are essential to generate haircuts in the empirically observed range.
In light of this discussion, our work differs from recent contributions that study the sustain-
ability of sovereign debt in the absence of reputational costs in three-period economies (e.g.,
Brutti, 2011; Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi, 2013). Similar to our approach, these papers in-
voke costs of default via repercussions for financial intermediation. However, given that the
underlying model environment abstracts from intertemporal dynamics, they are silent about
the determination and sustainability of steady state debt. By contrast, the present paper shows
that the existence of a dynamic debt Laffer curve always induces the government to issue debt
to a point where Vb(b
′) < 0; that is, marginal debt has negative welfare effects. As seen, equi-
librium debt positions, including steady state debt, would thus not be sustainable without at
least moderate reputational costs.
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A Appendix
A.1 First-order conditions
Recall the definition of Q(uc, b
′) via the bond pricing function (16),
Q(uc, b
′) = β
uc(b
′)
uc
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
,
and the associated partial derivatives,
Q1(uc, b
′) = −βuc(b
′)
(uc)2
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
,
Q2(uc, b
′) = β
uc(b
′)
uc
{
ucc(b
′)
uc(b′)
cˆb(b
′)
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
+
(
pˆib(b
′) + φˆb(b′)
)}
.
Similarly, from the definition of ω(b, n) in (17),
ω(b, n) =
 1 if (1− θ)b > ξcn(1−θ)b
ξcn
otherwise,
with ω1(b, n) = ω2(b, n) = 0 when ω(b, n) = 1 and otherwise
ω1(b, n) =
(1− θ)
ξcn
,
ω2(b, n) = −(1− θ)b
ξcn2
.
The first-order conditions characterizing optimal government behavior under commitment to
full debt repayment are given by
0 = uc(1 + γ) + γucc(c− (1 + pi)b) + γ(uccQ(uc, b′)b′ + ucQ1(uc, b′)uccb′)− γucpicb− ug
= uc(1 + γ) + γucc(c− (1 + pi)b)− γucpicb− ug,
0 = ul(1 + γ
1
ω(b, n)
)− γull 1
ω(b, n)
n+ γucpinb− ug − γul 1
ω(b, n)2
nω2(b, n),
0 = βVb(b
′) + γ(ucQ2(uc, b′)b′ + ucQ(uc, b′))
= βVb(b
′) + γβuc(b′)
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
{1 + εqb′} ,
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where εqb′ =
Q2(uc,b′)b′
Q(uc,b′) =
ucc(b′)
uc(b′) cˆb(b
′)b′ + (
pˆib(b
′)+φˆb(b′))b′
(1+pˆi(b′)+φˆ(b′))
. The envelope condition for b is
Vb(b) = −γ
{
uc(1 + pi)− uln
ω(b, n)2
ω1(b, n)
}
+ ugr.
Substitution into the first-order condition with respect to b′ yields the generalized Euler equation
(19),
γ′
{
u′c(1 + pi
′)− u
′
ln
′
ω(b′, n′)2
ω1(b
′, n′)
}
− u′gr = γu′c(1 + pi′ + φ′) {1 + εqb′} .
A.2 Recursive equilibrium under the option to default
The recursive equilibrium under the option to default is defined as follows:
Definition 2. A recursive equilibrium under the option to default is a collection of con-
sumption functions {cˆos, cˆds, cˆnds }s∈{f,a,e}, labor supply functions {nˆos, nˆds, nˆnds }s∈{f,a,e}, debt pol-
icy functions {bˆof , bˆoa, ˆ`oe, ˆ`de, bˆndf , bˆnda , ˆ`nde }, repayment policy functions {ρˆf , ρˆa, ρˆe}, value functions
{V of , V ndf , V df , V˜ d,W o,W nda ,W nde ,W d, W˜ d}, and pricing functions {Qb, Q`} such that:
(i) given V of , W
o, Qb, Q`, ρˆf , ρˆa and ρˆe, the policy functions {cˆndf , nˆndf , bˆndf } solve problem
(26); the policy functions {cˆdf , nˆdf , ˆ`df} solve problem (28); the policy functions {cˆnda , nˆnda , bˆnda }
solve problem (30); the policy functions {cˆnde , nˆnde , ˆ`nde } solve problem (31); the policy func-
tions {cˆda, nˆda, ˆ`da} and {cˆde, nˆde, ˆ`de} solve problem (33);
(ii) given {ρˆf , ρˆa, ρˆe}, the consumption policy functions satisfy cˆos = cˆnds when the government
fully repays debt and cˆos = cˆ
d
s otherwise; the labor and debt policies are constructed in the
same way;
(iii) given the value functions, the repayment policy functions {ρˆf , ρˆa, ρˆe} solve (25), (27), (29)
and (32);
(iv) given V nd and V d, the value function V o satisfies (25); given {W nda ,W nde ,W d}, the value
function W o satisfies (29);
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(v) given the policy functions, the pricing functions Qb and Q` satisfy
Qb(uc, b
′) = β
uc(cˆ
o
f (b
′))
uc
ρˆf (b
′)
(
1 + pˆiof (b
′) + φˆof (b
′)
)
,
Q`(uc, `
′) = αβ
uc(cˆ
o
a(`
′))
uc
ρˆa(`
′)
(
1 + φˆoa(`
′)
)
+ (1− α)βuc(cˆ
o
e(`
′))
uc
ρˆe(`
′)
(
1 + φˆoe(`
′)
)
.
(vi) given the policy functions and {V of ,W o}, the value functions {V ndf , V df , V˜ d,W nda ,W nde ,W d, W˜ d}
satisfy (26), (27), (28), (30), (31), (32) and (33).
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Under a collateral role of government debt, ξc > 0, zero debt is equiv-
alent to zero production in our model economy, such that a positive steady state debt level
emerges by construction. When there is only a liquidity role for government debt, ξc = 0 and
ξl > 0, a positive steady state debt level emerges, too. This follows directly from the generalized
Euler equation (19). When ξc = 0, the GEE, evaluated at the steady state, reads
−ug∗r = γ∗uc∗(1 + pi∗)εqb′∗.
Since ug
∗ > 0, uc∗ > 0, r > 0, pi∗ > 0 and γ∗ > 0, we have that ε
q
b′
∗ < 0. Since private agents
cannot go short in government bonds, it follows that b∗ > 0 and Q2∗ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. When ξc > 0, government debt is essential for production due to its
collateral role. Thus, by construction, in the neighborhood of b = 0 welfare is increasing in
debt. When ξc = 0 but r > 0, ω1(b, n) = 0 and the envelope condition for b is
Vb(b) = −γuc(1 + pi) + ugr = −γuc
(
1 +
ul
uc
r
)
+ ugr,
where the second equality follows from pi = ul
uc
r. The first-order condition with respect to n
implies
ug − ul = γ [ul − ulln+ ucpinb] = γ [ul − ull (n+ rb)] ,
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where the second equality follows from pin = −ullul pi = −
ull
uc
r. Solving for γ yields
γ =
ug − ul
ul − ull (n+ rb) > 0.
Substituting into the envelope condition and evaluating at b = 0,
Vb(0) = − ug − ul
ul − ullnuc
(
1 +
ul
uc
r
)
+ ugr.
It follows that Vb(0) > 0 if and only if(
(ul)
2 − ugulln
ul − ulln
)
r >
ug − ul
ul − ullnuc,
or equivalently,
r >
uguc − uluc
(ul)2 − ugulln =
uc
ul
− uc
ug
ul
ug
− ull
ul
n
=
uc
ul
1− ul
ug
ul
ug
− ull
ul
n
.
Finally, absent financial frictions, that is, when ξc = 0 and r = 0, the envelope condition for b
is unambiguously negative, Vb(b) = −γuc < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Problem (27) shows that, by choosing ρ, the government can effectively
regulate the state ρb in the value function V˜ d(ρb), subject to the constraint ρb ≤ b. Accordingly,
as ρ is chosen optimally, the value function V df (b) is non-decreasing over the entire state space.
To see this formally, note that the first-order condition for ρ associated with problem (27)
implies
γ
[
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)b− ucb
]
≥ 0, (34)
with equality in case of an interior solution. But then the envelope condition associated with
problem (28) implies
V˜ db (ρb) = γ
[
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)ρ− ucρ
]
= γ
ρ
b
[
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)b− ucb
]
≥ 0, (35)
where the weak inequality follows from (34), that is, under the optimal repayment policy
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associated with problem (27). It thus follows that V df (b) is non-decreasing.
Returning to (34), since ucb > 0, it follows that an interior solution can only arise when
ω1(ρb, n) > 0. The same argument also implies that ω1(ρb, n) > 0 is a necessary condition for a
corner solution at ρ = 1.20 Hence, the optimal repayment policy conditional on default, ρ˜d(b),
ensures that the collateral constraint is strictly binding. Given ω1(ρb, n) > 0, the envelope
condition (35) implies
V˜ db (b) = γ
[
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)ρ− ucρ
]
= γ
[
uln
ω(ρb, n)
1
b
− ucρ
]
.
This expression is monotonically decreasing in b and ρ. Given some ρ, there is thus a unique b
such that V˜ db (b) = 0. Let b
e denote the level of debt such that V˜ db (b
e) = 0 when ρ = 1. When
ρ = 1 and b < be, V˜ d(b) is increasing; a corner solution at full repayment, ρ˜d(b) = 1, is thus
indeed an optimizing choice, and V df (b) is increasing. Conversely, when ρ = 1 and b > b
e, V˜ d(b)
is decreasing, which contradicts (35); the optimal repayment policy conditional on default is
thus adjusted to an interior solution ρ˜d(b) < 1, and V df (b) is flat. Finally, when b = b
e, full
repayment, ρ˜d(b) = 1, is optimal.
Taking stock, when b < be, V df (b) is strictly increasing. Moreover, at b
e the collateral
constraint is strictly binding. When b < be, the government always finds it optimal to fully
repay its maturing bonds, ρ˜d(b) = 1. However, due to the market exclusion costs of default, it
follows that V ndf (b) > V
d
f (b) = V˜
d(b) for all b < be. By contrast, for any level of debt b > be such
that the government finds it optimal to default, V df (b) is constant, that is, the value conditional
on default is independent from initial debt. Denote this value by V¯ d. Moreover, under the
premise that the no-default value function V ndf (b) is monotonically decreasing for large levels
of debt and hence of an inverse U-shape, there exists a unique level of debt, b¯df > b
e, such that
V ndf (b¯
d
f ) = V¯
d. By the same argument, V ndf (b) ≥ V¯ d for b ≤ b¯df , and V nd(b) < V¯ d for b > b¯df .
Accordingly, the government fully repays its outstanding bonds up to the threshold level b¯df and
partially defaults if inherited debt exceeds this threshold. This is the optimal (unconditional)
repayment policy associated with problem (25); denote it by ρˆf (b).
In order to explicitly characterize the optimal (unconditional) repayment policy ρˆf (b), recall
20A corner solution at ρ = 0 can never occur because debt is essential for production.
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first that V ndf (b) ≥ V df (b) when b ≤ b¯df ; hence, ρˆf (b) = 1 for all b ≤ b¯df . Conversely, when
b > b¯df , V
nd
f (b) < V
d
f (b) and, since b¯
d
f > b
e, ρˆf (b) = ρ˜
d(b) < 1. But this implies that, for b ≥ be,
condition (34) holds at equality and ω1(ρb, n) > 0. Since
ul
uc
= (1 − τ)ω(ρb, n), condition (34)
then implies
ρb =
ul
uc
n
ω(ρb, n)
= (1− τ)n. (36)
But for interior solutions ρˆf (b) = ρ˜
d(b) < 1, V df (b) = V¯
d is constant; that is, b does not matter
for allocations and welfare, and (1− τ(b))n(b) is constant. It thus follows that the right-hand
side in (36) is constant, implying that ρˆf (b)b must be constant and equal to b
e for all b that
induce an interior solution for ρ. Since ρ ≤ 1, we thus have ρˆf (b) = be/b for b > be.
Similar arguments are readily available for the case when the government’s liabilities are in
the form of loans.21 In the region where W d(`) is increasing in `, the optimal repayment policy
conditional on default is given by ρ˜d(`) = 1. W d(`) is constant for all loan levels exceeding
a threshold `e. Comparison of problems (27)/(28) and (32)/(33) shows that W d(x) = V df (x)
for x ∈ {b, `}; hence, `e = be. Moreover, when W nda and W nde are of an inverse U-shape, there
exist unique thresholds ¯`da and
¯`d
e such that the government in state s ∈ {a, e} fully repays its
outstanding loans if and only if ` is below the threshold ¯`ds; otherwise, it partially defaults.
Finally, note that the no-default value functions satisfy V ndf (x) > W
nd
a (x) > W
nd
e (x) globally.
The first inequality follows because ugr− γucpi = r[ug − γul] > 0; the second inequality follows
because Qb(uc, x
′) > Q`(uc, x′) for all x′ ∈ {b′, `′}. Hence, the government’s default thresholds
satisfy b¯df >
¯`d
a >
¯`d
e. Accordingly, the economy’s maximum sustainable level of debt is given
by b¯df . Moreover, the default threshold under market exclusion is equal to
¯`d
e = `
e, which
follows from the property that W nde (`) < V¯
d if and only if ` > `e. The optimal (unconditional)
repayment policies when the government’s liabilities are in the form of loans, ρˆs(`) for s ∈ {a, e},
can be constructed analogously to their counterpart ρˆf (b) when the maturing liabilities are
bonds. When the government defaults, the optimal haircut reduces its effective liabilities (ρb
or ρ`) to be = `e, that is, to the lowest level that is consistent with the maximum default value
V¯ d.
21Recall also that the relevant value functions in problems (32) and (33) are independent of the market access
indicator s ∈ {a, e}.
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